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Abstract
In this article, the notion of accident for Greimasian Semiotics is discussed as proposed by Eric Landowski 
in his Interactions risquées (2005). The object of investigation includes civil and criminal proceedings and 
jurisprudence, using accidents that occurred in society as starting points. Semiotics conceptualization of 
accident includes the unpredictability, chance and risk lexemes. Thus, the main objective of this work is to 
verify how these elements are understood and assumed by the Judicial Area, as in jurisprudence, in civil 
and criminal proceedings. In other words, the objective of this paper is to investigate whether (or how) 
unpredictability, chance and risk constitute an integral part of the fiduciary contract between the sender 
and the addressee. In regards to this issue, there is in Law, two opposing principles: pacta sunt servanda 
and rebus sic stantibus. In the former, the judge rules that unpredictability be assumed by the party to 
contract and determines that the unpredictability burden must be assumed by the party to contract. In this 
case, unpredictability is part of the fiduciary contract between the sender and the addressee. In the latter, 
the judge rules that unpredictability should not be assumed by the parties to hire: it does not belong to 
the fiduciary contract. For Semiotics it is important to know how the accident and its unpredictability 
are understood and assumed differently by the Judiciary. Therefore, the objective here is to explain 
how the judicial area conceptualizes and understands risk, the random element and the accident. This is 
fundamental for a deep understanding and the development of reflections on the accident regime proposed 
by Eric Landowski.
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1. ACCIdENt IN sEMIOtICs
The objective of this article is to introduce the accident regime as a form of interaction, as 
proposed by Eric Landowski (CNRS/Paris) in his Les interactions risquées (2005).[1] An attempt 
to approximate this landowskinian approach to the Unpredictability Theory applied to Contract 
Rights is made, to discuss two basic principles: pacta sunt servanda and rebus sic stantibus. 
The objective is to identify converging and diverging points between two methodological 
proposals: on one side the accident in Semiotics and on the other side the Unpredictability 
Theory in Law.
By proposing the accident regime as a form of interaction, Landowksi opens up a new 
route, a new development for Semiotics discursive and narrative syntax. In this book, Landowski 
analyzes possible relationships among random events and their implications for interactions 
among subjects. Based on this premise, he discusses how «unpredictability» can determine 
meanings and interactions. 
However, it is necessary to conceptualize the term accident before introducing this new 
interaction regime. The Aurélio dictionary defines it as «a casual, fortuituous (act of God), 
unpredictable event». The Houaiss dictionary adds the lexeme «unexpected» to the Aurélio 
definition, describing accident as «any unpleasant and sad event, involving damages, losses, 
injuries, suffering or death». Actually, the term accident is used only to define a broad category 
from which a large number of other «subcategories» result, such as environmental, domestic, 
work-related, traffic accidents and others. 
According to Landowski, the basic principle behind the accident regime is the «random 
element», manifested by the presence of the fact that happens by chance, as a consequence of 
the risk. Its presence is not regular, or, at least, this regularity is unknown. For Landowski, the 
random element does not have a defining competence within the theory of Semiotics yet, neither 
of modal or aesthetics order. From a modal standpoint, the random element is not motivated, 
i.e., it acts with no reason. If intention exists, it is unknown. From an aesthetics point of view, 
the random element is undetermined, it has no body: it is not, therefore, of a sensible order.
Notwithstanding, the random element determines performance; more precisely, it deter-
mines accidents. Consequently, it is licit to suppose that, it somewhat contributes to the deve-
lopment of the narrative course. As an accident does not follow neither a pre-established order 
nor a systematic and programmed, predictable route, the nature of the role performed by the 
random element is not thematic, but catastrophic.
Unpredictability may characterize different types of accident. The challenge of the 
discourse analyst is to try to establish some standards; an order in the apparent chaos. This 
is what a court judge does (or should do) to determine the subjects involved and the type of 
participation each one had in the accident, to either verify responsibilities or to arrive to the 
conclusion that no one was responsible for the accident.
[1] This paper is the translation of an article first published in the annals of ABRALIN – Associação Brasileira 
de Linguística (Brasilian Linguistics Association) in 2009. The event was held in João Pessoa (Paraíba/Brazil) from 
4th to 7th of March. ISBN 978-85-7539-446-5.
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The other interaction regimes (programming, manipulation, and adjustment[2]), whose 
principles define regularity, intention and sensibility, also pose risks or, better yet, degrees of 
risk, since the relationship established among the subjects, even though remotely possible, can 
bring unexpected results. In an accident regime, risks are more intense than in other regimes. 
In programming, for instance, risks are almost nonexistent; they are related to the field of 
safety. In manipulation, risks are limited, thus greater than in programming. However, adjust-
ment is characterized by the lack of safety in the relationship. Finally, an accident, which is 
characterized by the total lack of security, is pure risk. Landowski adds that programming and 
manipulation characterize prudence in interactions, while adjustment and accident are deemed 
as adventure.
According to Landowski (2005, p. 70), there are two forms of risk: the result of «math 
probability» and the result of «mythic probability». The former sees the fortuitous element as 
an «inherent and without meaning» phenomenon. Thus risk is perceived as a calculated math 
probability, based on supposed manifestations, such as «winning the lottery», for instance. In 
the latter, risk is connected to fatality, which is a «transcendent and impenetrable» phenomenon, 
such as a natural disaster/catastrophe.
As for the nature of the roles developed by interaction regimes, Landowksi explains that, 
in programming, the roles are thematic; in manipulation, of modal competence; in adjustment, 
of aesthetic competence, and in the accident, catastrophic. 
Successful interaction regimes lead others to action. Manipulation leads to a make-
want (faire vouloir), adjustment to a make-feel (faire sentir), programming to a make-happen 
(faire advenir) and the accident to a make-supervene (faire survenir). In the two first cases 
(manipulation and adjustment), interaction leads to make-make. However, in the last two cases 
(programming and accident); it results in a make-be.
However, due to the possible fragility of the interaction involving the subjects, there 
are «assumed risks» in each one of the regimes. These assumed risks go from one extreme of 
the continuum to the other. In programming, for instance, risk is almost inexistent; it is the 
field of safety. In manipulation, risks are limited, therefore greater than those in programming. 
Adjustment, on the other hand, is characterized by insecurity in the relationship. And, finally, 
accident, which is characterized by total lack of safety, is pure risk. Landowski also explains 
that programming and manipulation characterize prudence in interactions, while adjustment 
and accident are marked by adventure.
As evidenced by the concept of accident, some lexemes such as «unpredictability», «the 
random element» and «risk» appear. It is necessary, however, to verify how these elements are 
meant and assumed by the legal area, as in jurisprudence, civil or criminal procedures, contracts, 
etc. In other words, it is important to understand how Law assigns responsibility to unpredic-
tability, the random element and accident. One possible way of doing it is by analyzing two 
Contracts Theory basic principles, pacta sunt servanda and rebus sic stantibus. As discussed 
later in this article, in the Unpredictability Theory, contract revisions by «force majeure» or 
[2] For a deeper understanding about these interaction regimes, cf. especially Passions sans nom (2004), 
de Eric Landowski. 
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«acts of God» (random element) are mentioned. These extra contractual elements may cause 
changes or even contract termination. The fact is that, in the core of «acts of God» and «force 
majeure», an accident may appear. Obviously, not all acts of God and force majeure situations 
will be deemed as accidents, as conceived by Landowski. However, all accidents are the result 
of an act of God or force majeure, thus justifying the pacta sunt servanda and rebus sic stan-
tibus principle approach discussed in this work.
2. PACTA SUNT SERvANDA VERsus REbUS SIC STANTIbUS
Law is pure language! It was created by men for men, thus, impossible not to be controversial. 
As personal world concepts change with time, Law adjusts itself to the new social reality, the 
new juridical spirit. Consequently, Law is always relative, dynamic and questionable: what was 
not, now is. This is particularly evident in the Law of Obligations, especially in Contract Law, 
since it is possible to create, change and even eliminate rights and legal obligations. 
So, before dealing with the Law of Contractual Obligations, the concept of contract 
should be defined. To do so, Maria Helena Diniz’s Tratado Teórico e Prático dos Contratos 
(Theorical and Practical Contracts Treaty) should be consulted. According to her (1996, p.11), 
a contract can be defined as «an agreement between two or more wills, in compliance with the 
legal order, to regulate the interests between the parties, with the intent to acquire, change or 
terminate legal relations of patrimonial nature».
Among other things, the General Theory of Contracts is controversial, due to two lea-
ding principles which, at first, seem contradictory. On one hand, there are the defenders of the 
pacta sunt servanda («formal pacts should be kept») principle and, on the other hand, there 
are those who identify themselves with the rebus sic stantibus («considering the way things 
are») principle.
The basic principle in pacta sunt servanda is the idea that contracts exist in society to be 
maintained, regardless future extra contractual terms and conditions. This principle includes one 
binding/compulsory jurisdiction established by the parties in a contract, which turns its articles 
into laws. Orlando Gomes, in his Contratos (Contracts) (1998, p.36) says that contracts must 
be maintained «with the observance of all assumptions and requirements needed to validate 
them, and must be executed by the parties as if their clauses were imperative legal rules». 
Maria Helena Diniz in her Tratado Teórico e Prático dos Contratos (Theoretical and Practical 
Contracts Treaty) corroborates with this concept, stating that contracts, «once concluded freely, 
are incorporated into the legal order, constituting a true legal norm.»
If, on one hand, the pacta sunt servanda principle mandates that the parties involved must 
honor the established contract, despite future adverse situations, some general Law principles 
must be considered (such as Good Faith, Legality, Equality, among others), whose objectives 
are to create a stable and harmonious social order. Thus, despite the juridical spirit in pacta 
sunt servanda, the obligation to comply with contractual clauses may not be absolute. Thus, 
another principle was created: rebus sic stantibus.
The Latin expression rebus sic stantibus is connected with the unpredictability principle 
which shows that the basis of a contract can be revised and reformulated due to an unpredic-
luiz carlos MiGliozzi ferreira de Mello
701
table and unexpected event occurred after the contract was signed by the parties, which may 
have resulted in an unfair and excessive onus to one of the parties. According to Maria Helena 
Diniz (2003, p. 336):
The excessive onus resulting from an extraordinary and unpredictable event, which 
makes the performance of one of the parties difficult, has, now, become a legal motive 
for contractual resolution, for being deemed as a rebus sic standibus clause, correspon-
ding to a formula where relational (successive performance) and fixed-term contracts 
have their mandatory binding always subject to the event in effect at the time of their 
stipulation. 
Actually, the rebus sic stantibus established the relativization of the pacta sunt servanda 
clause, which is excessively radical and inflexible. The rebus sic stantibus principles are evoked 
when «fortuitous element» and «force majeure» appear after a contract has been signed by 
the parties. 
In his article «A Teoria da imprevisão no Direito do Trabalho — Cláusula ínsita rebus 
sic stantibus» (The Unpredictability Theory in Labor Law — the rebus sic standibus prin-
ciple), published in the Legal Page of the Universidade Veiga de Almeida, Rio de Janeiro[3], 
Arnaldo Goldemberg explains that force majeure originates from human acts and acts of God 
from natural phenomena. He emphasizes that Cunha Gonçalves, Valentin Carrion and Mozart 
Victor Russomano do not make this distinction. For them, both acts of God and force majeure 
can originate from human acts, private or not. 
Goldemberg also points out that acts of God and force majeure are linked to the idea 
of accident and, it is unpredictability, accident’s own characteristic, that releases the affected 
party from the contractual responsibility:
In acts of God and force majeure, there is always an accident responsible for the damage. 
In force majeure, the cause of gave origin to the event is known, since it is a natural fact, 
such as lightening causing fires, for instance; floods damaging products; frosts ruining crops; 
implying an idea of relativity, since the power of event is greater than the supposed, where 
previous consideration of the state of the subject and the space-temporal circumstances 
should be made, for civil liability release be efficiently characterized.
Maria Helena Diniz (1996b, p. 80), in her Curso de Direito Civil Brasileiro (Course in 
Brazilian Civil Law), corroborates with the same idea mentioned above, i.e., she connects acts 
of God and force majeure to accidents, releasing one of the parties from the excessive onus of 
the contract due to the unpredictability of the fact:
[3] In the article published on the University site, there is no reference to the year in which the article was 
written or disseminated on the Web. Also, pages are not marked in the article. However, it can be recovered in its 
entirety in the following electronic address: http://www.uva.br/icj/artigos_de_professores/Teor_%20Impr_%20Dire_
%20Trab.htm
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In acts of God (RT, 431:74, 346:336, 356:522, 399:370, 453:92), the accident that 
causes damages originates from: (1) unknown causes such as an aerial electrical cable 
that breaks down and falls on phone cables, causing fire; the explosion of power plant 
boilers, or a machine malfunction provoking death; or (2) events such as mutiny, change 
of government, product discontinuation, which cause serious accidents or damages due 
to the impossibility of complying with some obligations. Absolute, for being totally 
unpredictable or unrecognizable with some diligence, in a way that subject liability 
could not be thought, obligations incurred, unless it was agreed to pay or whether the 
Law imposes this obligation, as in the cases of objective liability.
In this article, Goldemberg, lists factors from which the theory of unpredictability may 
be evoked:
The application of the theory of unpredictability depends on the co-existence of (a) 
a supervining fact; (b) unpredictability; (c) irrestibility; (d) inexistence of direct or 
indirect contest in the event and (e) the economical - financial imbalance of one of the 
parties.
The author also mentions that the Consumer Protection Code, created by Law number 
8.078/90, makes clear the supremacy of the public authority over abusive contracts. 
He also lists articles (51, 52, e 53) that, whenever violated, can call for contract ter-
mination. Thus the role played by the public authority in controlling and preventing abuses 
becomes clear, «keeping the hypo-sufficient safe from the abuses of power, looking for social 
balance».
Article 6º of the Consumer Protection Code makes evident the rebus sic stantibus 
principle: 
Art. 6º Basic consumer rights are: [...]
V – Alteration of contractual clauses that establishes unproportional installments or their 
revision due to supervining facts that make them extremely onerous. 
In the Brazilian Civil Code, the same principle appears to maintain social order, preven-
ting abuses of power in society: 
On the Excessive Onus Resolution: Art. 478. In contracts of continuous or deferred execu-
tion, if the installment becomes too onerous to one of the parties, with an extreme advantage 
to the other party, due to extraordinary and unpredictable events, the debtor may demand 
contract termination. The effects of the sentence will be retroactive to the contract’s noti-
fication date. Art. 479. The resolution may be prevented if the defendant decides to make 
contract terms equal. Art. 480. If in the contract, obligations bind only one of the parties, 
an installment reduction or a change in execution mode may be demanded to avoid exces-
sive onus.
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It is important to emphasize that the excessive onus of the contract, necessary to call for 
the principle of rebus sic stantibus, must be in fact excessive to cause a financial imbalance in 
the contract for both parties. As Goldember says: 
We are not dealing with any type of excessive onus. It must be the one that originates from 
an extraordinary and unpredictable event. The contractual imbalance that causes excessive 
onus must be thus considered in relation to the adjustment terms during the contract cele-
bration. The installment from one of the parties cannot «become» excessively onerous. 
However, if the original contract included this condition, the unpredictability theory will 
not apply.
3. ACCIdENt IN sEMIOtICs ANd thE uNPREdICtAbIlIty thEORy 
The argument behind the pacta sunt servanda principle is that risks are present when contracts 
are signed. However, the presence of risk is something immaterial. It can be imagined but it 
does not have a corporeal, tangible form. Risk is simply the potentialization of an accident 
which may not even occur. Therefore, risks cannot be perceived or conceived by the actors, 
specially by those who are characterized by the not knowing and that, at the discursive level, 
are realized in the hypo-sufficient individual dealt with by the Law. However, risks can have 
catastrophic consequences (performance), materialized in an accident motivated by either acts 
of God or force majeure, according to jurists, or either by a mythical or mathematical proba-
bility, as Landowski would say.
The argumentative basis supporting the rebus sic stantibus principle is that of good 
faith and citizen equal rights. Thus, it can be inferred that, if the actor had been modalized by 
knowledge, i.e., if he had known that the assumed risks would lead him to the non-compliance 
of his fiduciary contract, he would have acted differently, in order to preserve his image in 
society, honoring the assumed commitment and realizing his performance. Thus, he cannot be 
held responsible for something he did not know. Neither can he be sanctioned for his failure 
to perform, since he is characterized as a virtual subject. In addition, he cannot be punished 
for an event (performance) that took place in a non-motivated or, as Landowski would say, 
«meaningless» way.
From an epistemological standpoint, accidents, acts of God and risks have modal func-
tions, participate in the narrative route and characterize actors. According to the assumption of 
the random element manifested by the figure of chance and, consequently, of risk, actors can 
be prudent, imprudent, ignorant, wise, experts or non-experts, negligent, etc. Notwithstanding 
this diversity in actors characterization, the underlying principle in rebus sic stantibus is that 
they must be considered as equals (constitutional principle) by justice.
At the heart of all this is the principle of society moralization, manifested by the principles 
of justice, Law’s greatest goal. This principle is found in both pacta sunt servanda and rebus 
sic stantibus. While the first is extremely radical, inflexible, the second appears to relativize 
the first, to be its exception. It is in this search for social balance that the process of society 
moralization lies.
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This notion of moralization or just, equal and coherent social order is found in several 
moments during contract revision discussions, as mentioned by César Fiúza (n/d p. 5):
A contract bind can be explained much more by the social relevance of the situation 
objectively established by the parties than by its own and exclusive will, either found in 
its objective or subjective reality. [...] Several new principles were taken on by modern 
doctrine, trying to meet the demands of the new times. Thus contractual principles deve-
lop radically, focusing on the preceptive theory, principles of self-responsibility and trust, 
giving rise to the principles of good faith and contractual justice.
This same assumption can be found in Arnaldo Godemberg’s article mentioned above: 
«the supremacy of the public interest in banning adjustments against Ethics, public order and 
good behavior adjustments. The celebration of a contract must respect the rules of the social 
order, collective safety, patrimonial balance and the well being of all».
4. FINAl CONsIdERAtIONs
The existence of the pacta sunt servanda and rebus sic stantibus principles implies the need to 
look beyond the contract. It is important to analyze the socio-economic conditions prevalent 
during the signature of the contract and those prevalent during the moment of disagreement. 
In this sense, the so-called literal interpretation of the law does not apply anymore. Being an 
interpreter of the law is, first and foremost, being an interpreter of the social conditions under 
which the contract was firmed. 
As mentioned before, initially, the two principles (pacta sunt servanda e rebus sic 
stantibus) seem antagonistic, but they are not. Both have the same basic principle: the mora-
lization of society. In the first case, the immanence of the text points out to the need to create 
mechanisms to preserve the will and the freedom of the actors. Therefore, it is important for 
legal institutions to believe in societies. Without this, there will be no just and coherent social 
order. With the same interest in establishing and maintaining a just and coherent social order, 
the second principle emphasizes the need to foresee, or at least consider, unpredictability, which 
can create an imbalance in the already established social order.
Both, the principles of pacta sunt servanda and rebus sic stantibus try to create legal 
mechanisms to preserve the social order, guaranteed by the constitutional social equality 
principle. On the other hand, the fragility cannot succumb to the power, and freedom override 
oppression. Private interests or those of a few cannot override collective interests. These are 
the bases of social regulation or, as it is always said, of social moralization. However, it is 
important to remember that contractual obligations are the rule and that unpredictability is the 
exception.
Thus, the association of these two areas of knowledge, Semiotics and Law, is very 
proficuous and promising. The accident regime developed by Landowski brought the two areas 
close together, since the area of Law, by its nature, work with accidents. It is believed that the 
Semiotics analytical potential can bring fundamental contributions to Law and vice-versa.
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There is lots of research to be done on the model presented by Landowski, especially in 
relation to the accident regime. In Brazil, for instance, there is too little research on accident 
from a theoretical semiotics standpoint. The only theoretical material on the subject is the book 
Les interactions risquées by Landowski himself,which needs to be imported to Brazil.
Accident is better understood and dealt with by other areas of knowledge such as Law, 
for instance. The approximation of these two areas is healthy for both and, certainly will con-
tribute to the theoretical development of the accident regime in Semiotics.
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